Representation of attended versus remembered locations in prefrontal cortex.
Lebedev MA, Messinger A, Kralik JD, Wise SP.
Laboratory of Systems Neuroscience, National Institute of Mental Health, Bethesda, Maryland, USA. lebedev@neuro.duke.edu
PLoS Biol. 2004 Nov;2(11):e365. Epub 2004 Nov.

A great deal of research on the prefrontal cortex (PF), especially in nonhuman primates, has focused on the theory that it functions predominantly in the maintenance of short-term memories, and neurophysiologists have often interpreted PF's delay-period activity in the context of this theory. Neuroimaging results, however, suggest that PF's function extends beyond the maintenance of memories to include aspects of attention, such as the monitoring and selection of information. To explore alternative interpretations of PF's delay-period activity, we investigated the discharge rates of single PF neurons as monkeys attended to a stimulus marking one location while remembering a different, unmarked location. Both locations served as potential targets of a saccadic eye movement. Although the task made intensive demands on short-term memory, the largest proportion of PF neurons represented attended locations, not remembered ones. The present findings show that short-term memory functions cannot account for all, or even most, delay-period activity in the part of PF explored. Instead, PF's delay-period activity probably contributes more to the process of attentional selection.

 
Perception, action, and Roelofs effect: a mere illusion of dissociation
Dassonville P, Bala JK.
Department of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon, USA. prd@darkwing.uoregon.edu
PLoS Biol. 2004 Nov;2(11):e364. Epub 2004 Nov.

A prominent and influential hypothesis of vision suggests the existence of two separate visual systems within the brain, one creating our perception of the world and another guiding our actions within it. The induced Roelofs effect has been described as providing strong evidence for this perception/action dissociation: When a small visual target is surrounded by a large frame positioned so that the frame's center is offset from the observer's midline, the perceived location of the target is shifted in the direction opposite the frame's offset. In spite of this perceptual mislocalization, however, the observer can accurately guide movements to the target location. Thus, perception is prone to the illusion while actions seem immune. Here we demonstrate that the Roelofs illusion is caused by a frame-induced transient distortion of the observer's apparent midline. We further demonstrate that actions guided to targets within this same distorted egocentric reference frame are fully expected to be accurate, since the errors of target localization will exactly cancel the errors of motor guidance. These findings provide a mechanistic explanation for the various perceptual and motor effects of the induced Roelofs illusion without requiring the existence of separate neural systems for perception and action. Given this, the behavioral dissociation that accompanies the Roelofs effect cannot be considered evidence of a dissociation of perception and action. This indicates a general need to re-evaluate the broad class of evidence purported to support this hypothesized dissociation.

 
A neuroeconomics approach to inferring utility functions in sensorimotor control.
Kording KP, Fukunaga I, Howard IS, Ingram JN, Wolpert DM.
Sobell Department of Motor Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom. konrad@koerding.de
PLoS Biol. 2004 Oct;2(10):e330. Epub 2004 Sep 21.

Making choices is a fundamental aspect of human life. For over a century experimental economists have characterized the decisions people make based on the concept of a utility function. This function increases with increasing desirability of the outcome, and people are assumed to make decisions so as to maximize utility. When utility depends on several variables, indifference curves arise that represent outcomes with identical utility that are therefore equally desirable. Whereas in economics utility is studied in terms of goods and services, the sensorimotor system may also have utility functions defining the desirability of various outcomes. Here, we investigate the indifference curves when subjects experience forces of varying magnitude and duration. Using a two-alternative forced-choice paradigm, in which subjects chose between different magnitude-duration profiles, we inferred the indifference curves and the utility function. Such a utility function defines, for example, whether subjects prefer to lift a 4-kg weight for 30 s or a 1-kg weight for a minute. The measured utility function depends nonlinearly on the force magnitude and duration and was remarkably conserved across subjects. This suggests that the utility function, a central concept in economics, may be applicable to the study of sensorimotor control.

 
The Bayesian brain: the role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation.
Knill DC, Pouget A.
Center for Visual Science and the Department of Brain and Cognitive Science, University of Rochester, NY 14627, USA. knill@cvs.rochester.edu
Trends Neurosci. 2004 Dec;27(12):712-9.

To use sensory information efficiently to make judgments and guide action in the world, the brain must represent and use information about uncertainty in its computations for perception and action. Bayesian methods have proven successful in building computational theories for perception and sensorimotor control, and psychophysics is providing a growing body of evidence that human perceptual computations are "Bayes' optimal". This leads to the "Bayesian coding hypothesis": that the brain represents sensory information probabilistically, in the form of probability distributions. Several computational schemes have recently been proposed for how this might be achieved in populations of neurons. Neurophysiological data on the hypothesis, however, is almost non-existent. A major challenge for neuroscientists is to test these ideas experimentally, and so determine whether and how neurons code information about sensory uncertainty.